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JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE
COURTS. By Barry C. Feld. Northeastern University Press 1993.
Pp. 329.
I. INTRODUCTION: PROCEDURAL FORMALITY AND THE NATURE OF
THE JUVENILE COURT
On June 8, 1964, fifteen-year-old Gerald Francis Gault was ar-
rested after police in Gila County, Arizona, received a complaint re-
garding an obscene phone call.' The next day, proceedings were
initiated against Gerald in juvenile court.2 During these proceed-
ings, Gerald was unrepresented by counsel. The State of Arizona
never provided Gerald or his parents with any statement describing
the factual allegations against him or the statute he was charged
with violating.3 The complaining witness never appeared before the
judge, despite requests by Gerald's mother for an in-court identifi-
cation to clear her son of any wrongdoing.4 No witnesses were
sworn. No record was kept of the testimony.5 At the conclusion of
the proceedings, Gerald was committed to the State Industrial
School "for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless
* Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Cook County Public Defender, Chicago,
Illinois. J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1991. A.B., Georgetown University,
1988.
I In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
2 Id. at 5.
3 Id. at 5-9.
4 Id. at 7.
5 Id. at 5-9.
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sooner discharged by due process of law." 6
The Supreme Court reversed the finding of delinquency, de-
claring that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court. ' 7 The Court held that juveniles
are entitled to notice of charges,8 assistance of counsel,9 confronta-
tion of witnesses, 10 and the privilege against self-incrimination" at
proceedings to determine whether a minor has violated the law.
The Gault decision rang in a new era for the juvenile court.
While a number of jurisdictions had previously adopted procedural
protections for juveniles accused of committing crimes, the
Supreme Court imposed such protections as a constitutional mini-
mum.1 2 Shortly after Gault, the Supreme Court also held that crimi-
nal conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. 13 The infusion of formal procedures was
viewed by some observers as a threat to the character of the juvenile
court. 14
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reformers
were appalled by the way the criminal justice system treated chil-
dren-giving young offenders harsh sentences and having them
serve their punishment in penal institutions surrounded by adult
criminals. The juvenile court system developed out of the progres-
sive movement's vision of children as inherently innocent beings
who could be molded into productive citizens.
The progressives established a framework entirely separate
from adult criminal courts. Minors are adjudicated delinquent, not
convicted of crimes. The juvenile judge holds a dispositional hear-
6 Id. at 7-8 (brackets in original).
7 Id. at 28.
8 Id. at 33-34.
9 Id. at 41-42.
10 Id. at 56.
11 Id. at 55.
12 See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
13 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
14 For example, Chief Justice Burger stated:
[The Court has taken] steps eroding the differences between juvenile courts and
traditional criminal courts. The original concept of the juvenile court system was to
provide a benevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could provide for
dealing with the special and often sensitive problems of youthful offenders. ...
What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of legal
procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breathing
room and flexibility in order to survive, if it can survive the repeated assaults from
this Court.
Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Gault, 387 U.S. at 78-80 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); BARRY KRISBERG &JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 49, 80 (1993);
Orman W. Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault, Revolutionay Requirements and Reappraisal, 53
VA. L. REV. 1700, 1701 (1967).
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ing, not a sentencing hearing. The juvenile court's concern at the
dispositional hearing is not punishment, but the best interests of the
minor. The traditional punitive concerns of retribution and deter-
rence give way to treatment and rehabilitation. 15 Judge Julian Mack
explained the purposes of the juvenile court in 1909:
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a
boy or girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is,
physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading
the path that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to
punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to
develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen. 16
Thus, the juvenile court judge evaluates the individual offender's
needs and fashions a program to improve the minor. Experts in
child psychology and social work advise the judge of what is needed
to reform the child and the judge implements the appropriate pro-
posals through a dispositional order.1 7
Many procedural rights guaranteed to adults in criminal cases
have been deemed inappropriate in the juvenile context. Juvenile
court judges need flexibility to determine the most appropriate dis-
position for minors. 18 In rejecting the right to jury trials for
juveniles, for example, the Supreme Court noted that "the jury trial,
if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the ju-
venile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an ef-
fective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate,
15 Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. See BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 10 (1993); KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at
29-32; ANNE RANKIN MAHONEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 17-21 (1987); ROBERT M.
MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1825-
1940, 130-35 (1973);Joel Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 9-10. Other, less high-minded supporters
viewed the juvenile court as a means of enforcing social control while evading constitu-
tional protections. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 31.
16 Julian B. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
17 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 539 (1971) (" '[T]he juvenile system
has available and utilizes much more fully various diagnostic and rehabilitative services'
that are 'far superior to those available in the regular criminal process.' ") (quoting In re
Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970)); In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 951 (Nev. 1983)
("Enforcing the state's interests in a manner designed to hold juveniles responsible for
their violations of the criminal laws need not by any means dilute the strength of educa-
tive and rehabilitative measures properly taken by the juvenile courts in attempting to
socialize and civilize errant youth."); FELD, supra note 15, at 9-10.
18 See FELD, supra note 15, at 14-16. Jane Addams explained the informal vision of
the juvenile court's creators:
There was almost a change in mores when the juvenile court was established. The
child was brought before the judge with no one to prosecute him and none to de-
fend him-the judge and all concerned were merely trying to find out what could be
done on his behalf. The element of conflict was absolutely eliminated and with it all
notions of punishment as such with its curiously belated connotations.
MENNEL, supra note 15, at 133.
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informal protective proceeding." 19 As envisioned by its creators,
the juvenile court should not be encumbered by procedures that al-
low needy children to avoid supervision and control merely because
of legal technicalities or juror nullification. Furthermore, concepts
of proportionality could frustrate the efforts to help a child in need.
The founders of the juvenile court believed that society has a moral
obligation to impose a severe disposition if a child would benefit
from such state involvement, regardless of whether the conduct that
brought the child to the attention of the authorities is a heinous fel-
ony or a petty offense. The question is not what the child deserves,
but what is best for the child.
Unfortunately, flexibility permits abuses. After reviewing the
facts in Gault, the Supreme Court quoted Dean Roscoe Pound's
warning that "the powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in com-
parison with those of our juvenile courts."' 20 Most apparent, flexi-
bility can lead to excesses in the name of rehabilitation. Inevitably,
at least some of the determinations made by unrestrained juvenile
court judges will be inappropriate for and unfair to the children they
are intended to help. Furthermore, many juvenile court judges are
not convinced by the progressive movement's vision of the inherent
goodness of all children. Thus, individual judges sometimes use the
wide powers granted in the name of rehabilitation to mete out
punishment. 21
When judges do seek rehabilitative programs, state correctional
systems often frustrate the judiciary's remedial efforts. Many cor-
rectional facilities for juveniles are harsh institutions that serve to
warehouse offenders rather than rehabilitate them.22 The lack of
social services is compounded by the mistreatment of children. Re-
ports of physical and sexual violence by staff members and fellow
inmates are widespread. 23 Given the reality of what happens to
many juveniles during their period of "rehabilitation," the Court in
Gault believed that some procedural protections are necessary. 24
19 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
20 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). The Court warned, "The absence of substantive
standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, indi-
vidualized treatment .... Departures from established principles of due process have
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." Id. at 19-20. See
also MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 22-24 (discussing flexibility and discretion in the juvenile
courts as a "two-edged sword").
21 See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
22 FELD, supra note 15, at 266-67.
23 Id. RICHARD LUNDMAN, PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DELINQUENCY 219-22 (1993);
Dale G. Parent, Conditions of Confinement, Juv. JusT., Spring/Summer 1993, at 4, 4-5;
CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 423 (1978).
24 Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28.
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The Supreme Court was careful to caution, however, that pro-
cedural protections would not require the elimination of a separate
juvenile court system focused on rehabilitation. The Court stated:
While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a
degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings to deter-
mine delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some ele-
ments of the adversary system, nothing will require that the
conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite,
nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process
requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine
the disposition of the delinquent child. 25
Thus, the fundamental character of the juvenile court was to remain
intact. Although minors would have some procedural protections at
the guilt-determining stage of the proceedings, the juvenile court
would retain its characteristically informal dispositional hearing
when deciding what is in the best interests of the child.
Injustice for Children: The Right to Counsel and the Juvenile Courts,
26
Barry C. Feld questions whether the Supreme Court's expectations
have been realized. Feld argues that a tension exists between the
progressive movement's ideal of a flexible juvenile court imposing
social controls on children in need of supervision and the due pro-
cess model of a juvenile court operating within the constitutional
framework of criminal courts. The book evaluates the conflict be-
tween the traditional vision of the juvenile court and the procedural
requirements now constitutionally imposed upon it and concludes
that the procedural protections now guaranteed to children accused
of crimes have led to a harsher, more punitive juvenile court.
Feld uses representation by counsel as a proxy for the overall
level of formality in individual juvenile court systems. The presence
of counsel makes it more likely that a respondent will invoke other
procedural rights. A defense attorney, for example, presumably will
file motions to quash illegal arrests and suppress suggestive identifi-
25 Id. at 27. Three years after Gault, the Court included a similar disclaimer when
ruling on the burden of proof required for a finding of delinquency:
Nor will [the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard have] any effect on the
informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding takes place.
And the opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a
wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized treatment
will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be no effect on the procedures distinc-
tive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970). Why the separation of the guilt-determining
phase from the dispositional phase ofjuvenile proceedings is not an adequate means of
retaining the flexible, rehabilitative character of the juvenile court, while granting the
right to jury trials, was never explained by the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26 FELD, supra note 15.
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cations and involuntary statements when potential Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment violations exist. Defense attorneys will also
typically advise respondents of their right to remain silent. Addi-
tionally, professional attorneys-should be more adept at questioning
state witnesses and presenting defense arguments than minors or
their parents. Finally, a defense attorney is likely to increase the
adversarial nature of the proceedings merely by being present as a
counter to the probation officer or prosecuting attorney.27
As a practical matter, the measurement of other procedural
rights would be difficult. Nobody can accurately count the number
of cases in which minors would be compelled to testify or in which
cross-examination of witnesses would not take place absent the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in Gault. Researchers would face
a significant challenge in attempting to count the number of convic-
tions that would occur under a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard as opposed to the reasonable doubt standard required under
Winship. The right to counsel is one of the few proxies by which to
measure the broader procedural approach of a court system.
Feld utilizes data from several jurisdictions, rather than the an-
ecdotal observations that often permeate discussions ofjuvenilejus-
tice.28 First, he evaluates information collected in 1984 by the
27 Id at 76-157. By failing to evaluate the effect of plea agreements, Feld does not
account for the possibility that counsel may actually reduce the adversarial nature of
proceedings in juvenile court. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. Even if most
cases are resolved by plea agreements, however, the presence of defense counsel proba-
bly still increases the formality of the juvenile court process. At a minimum, the fact that
a prosecutor must tender an offer to a defense attorney, who then discusses the options
with the client, introduces an extra level of procedure.
There is some evidence that indirectly supports Feld's contention. Edwin Lemert
reported significant delays in cases with represented youths when California granted the
right to counsel in 1961. Edwin M. Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 421, 431.
Richard Chused studied juvenile court systems in three counties in New Jersey in
1970. He reported that counsel was associated with significant delays during the adjudi-
catory stage of the proceedings. Richard H. Chused, The Juvenile Court Process: A Study of
Three New Jersey Counties, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 488, 520 (1973).
Anne Rankin Mahoney has compiled data indicating that cases involving repre-
sented juveniles take, on the average, three times as long to go from arraignment to
disposition as cases involving unrepresented juveniles. MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 57.
Mahoney's data, however, came from a study of only one wealthy, suburban county.
Fifty-five percent of youths were represented and 69% of represented youths had pri-
vate counsel. Id
28 Few studies have evaluated the effects of counsel on dispositions received byjuve-
nile respondents. Most work on this subject consists of observations made shortly after
the Gault decision. In 1967, for example, an observer in Philadelphia reported that "the
number of children being committed to institutions has dropped markedly as the pro-
portion of children represented by counsel has risen." Spencer Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile
Court, 13 GRIME & DELINQ. 488, 493 (1967). In New Jersey, commitments to the State
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California Bureau of Criminal Statistics and Special Services, the
Minnesota Supreme Court's Judicial Information System, the Ne-
braska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the
New York Office of Court Administration, the North Dakota Office
of State Court Administrator, and the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court
Judge's Commission.2 9 After comparing and evaluating data from
the six jurisdictions ("the six-state survey"), Feld then conducts a
more thorough inquiry on data collected by the Minnesota Supreme
Home for Boys went from 736 in May 1967, to 387 in February 1968. Benedict S. Alper,
The Children's Court at Three Score and Ten: Will it Survive Gault? 34 ALa. L. REV. 46, 60
(1969).
After California enacted a statutory right to counsel in juvenile cases in 1961,
Lemert reviewed the outcomes of 1,760juvenile court cases in Sacramento County dur-
ing 1962 and 1963. Respondents were represented in 17.6% of the cases. Parties who
were represented by counsel were three times more likely to have their cases dismissed
than those who were unrepresented.
While represented parties fared much better than unrepresented parties, Lemert's
statistics include dependency cases. In fact, the largest percentage of the dismissals oc-
curred in dependency cases rather than delinquency cases. Id. at 443.
In at least one important category for minors accused of delinquency, counsel was
associated with harsher treatment. While 12.3% of represented youths were committed
to the California Youth Authority, only 5.9% of unrepresented youths received this
harsh disposition. Id. at 442-43.
Chused studied three New Jersey counties in 1970 and reported that represented
juveniles were slightly less likely to be found delinquent than unrepresented minors.
Chused, supra note 27, at 520. Once a child had been found delinquent, however, the
effects of procedural formality on the disposition were much more significant. New
Jersey employed a two-tiered juvenile court system at the time of Chused's study, as-
signing some cases to a "formal" court calendar and other cases to an "informal" court
calendar. Id. at 489-90. The right to counsel was guaranteed in formal calendars, but
not in informal calendars.
Chused reported significant differences in the dispositions received by respondents
in the different calendars. More than a third (33.6%) of the respondents in the formal
juvenile courts were committed to out-of-home placements or secured facilities, while
only 7.3% of juveniles in the informal courts received such severe dispositions. Id. at
597. More than half (53.8%) of the respondents in the informal calendars received mi-
nor dispositions, avoiding even probation. Only 10% of the children in the formal cal-
endars were similarly treated. Id.
A number of factors correlated with the initial decision whether to assign a case to a
formal or informal calendar, including the number of prior court referrals, previous dis-
positions received by juveniles with prior referrals, and the seriousness of the offense.
Id. at 567-76. Unfortunately, Chused did not account for these factors while comparing
treatment in the formal and informal calendars.
Stevens Clarke and Gary Koch reviewed the outcomes of 1,435 cases in the juvenile
courts of Winston-Salem and Charlotte, North Carolina, during 1975 and 1976. Stevens
H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch,Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a
Difference?, 14 LAW & SociETY REV. 263, 271 (1980). After accounting for the respon-
dent's prior record, the seriousness of the offense, the relationship of the complaining
witness to the respondent, and parental support for the respondent, Clarke and Koch
discovered that "children without counsel were less likely to be committed" to a correc-
tional facility. Id. at 301.
29 FELD, supra note 15, at 43.
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Court's Judicial Information System during 1986.30
Feld reports that large numbers of youths go unrepresented in
juvenile delinquency hearings.3 ' More surprising, children who are
represented by counsel usually receive more severe sanctions than
children who are unrepresented, even after accounting for the seri-
ousness of the offense and the prior record of the juvenile.3 2 Inter-
preting the data, Feld suggests that procedural protections inject a
level of conflict and formality into the juvenile court. The adver-
sarial nature of the proceedings could antagonize judges into treat-
ing juveniles more harshly. Children who appear without counsel,
however, could be perceived by judges as throwing themselves upon
the mercy of the court and thus receive less severe sanctions.33 Ad-
ditionally, procedural formality may allow a judge to feel justified in
imposing punitive sanctions because of a perception that the youth
was adequately protected during the proceedings. Thus, formality
could embolden juvenile court judges into ordering stern penalties
that they would not otherwise employ.3 4 If this is true, Feld argues,
the procedural formality required by the Supreme Court in Gault
has actually resulted in more severe treatment of juveniles.
II. DIFFERING LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
In some jurisdictions, the vast majority of children accused of
crimes are represented by counsel. More than 95% of youths ac-
cused of committing crimes or status offenses3 5 in New York, for
example, are represented by counsel.3 6 The percentages of minors
who are represented in Pennsylvania and-California are also high-
86.4% and 84.9% respectfully. 37 Other jurisdictions, however, are
characterized by significantly lower rates of representation. In Ne-
braska, only 52.7% of minors are represented by counsel in delin-
quency proceedings. 38  Likewise, only 47.7% of juveniles are
represented in Minnesota and only 37.5% are represented in North
Dakota. 39
30 Id. at 44.
31 See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
33 FELD, supra note 15, at 74, 100, 253-54.
34 Id. at 253-54. The author will refer to both of these theories as "the antagonism
hypothesis."
35 A status offense is conduct that is illegal due to the age of the offender (i.e., the
offender's status as a minor). Examples include truancy and curfew violations. BLAcK's
LAW DIcTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "status crime").






The differences in rates of representation are not necessarily
tied to less serious patterns of juvenile crime. After correcting for
the seriousness of the offense, variations in rates of representation
remain significant. In Minnesota, more than a third of all minors
accused of committing felony offenses are not represented by coun-
sel.40 In North Dakota, more than 40% ofjuveniles accused of felo-
nies are unrepresented. 4 1  Although all minors accused of
committing felonies against persons in North Dakota are repre-
sented by counsel, more than 60% of North Dakota youths accused
of committing felony property offenses proceed without the assist-
ance of counsel.4
2
More distressing, large numbers of unrepresented children re-
ceive severe dispositions. Feld divides the harshest dispositions that
could be ordered by a juvenile court into two categories: commit-
ments to out-of-home placements (such as group homes, substance
abuse treatment programs, or psychiatric hospitals) and commit-
ments to secured facilities. 43
Large percentages of unrepresented youths receive severe dis-
positions in all of the jurisdictions evaluated by Feld. In Minnesota,
for example, nearly one-third of the youths sent to out-of-home
placements and more than one-quarter committed to secured facili-
ties are unrepresented by counsel.44 More than 35% of unrepre-
sented youths charged with felonies against persons in California
are sent to out-of-home placements, and more than 15% of them
are committed to secured facilities. 45 In Nebraska, more than 28%
of unrepresented youths charged with felony offenses against per-
sons are committed to out-of-home placements, and more than 20%
of such youths are sentenced to secured facilities.
46
The Supreme Court has not mandated an unwaivable right to
counsel in all juvenile cases. The Gault decision requires only that
juveniles and their parents be notified of the right to counsel, in-
cluding the right to state-funded counsel if the family is unable to
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. Surprisingly, many minors facing serious charges in high representation juris-
dictions also proceed without the assistance of counsel. In California, for example,
more than 10% of minors accused of committing felonies against persons proceed with-
out representation by counsel. Nearly 9% of similarly charged youths in Pennsylvania
go unrepresented. Id.
43 Id. at 45-46.
44 Id. at 100.
45 Id. at 59.
46 Id.
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afford a private attorney.
47
Feld theorizes that differences in rates of representation might
be the result of juvenile court judges admonishing juveniles and
their families in such a way as to discourage requests for counsel.48
The manner in which judges or other actors in the juvenile justice
system describe the need for counsel undoubtedly can influence a
youth's choice whether to secure the services of an attorney.49
Feld evaluates a number of factors associated with differing
levels of representation. Youths who are detained prior to trial, for
example, are more likely to be represented by counsel than youths
who are not detained. 50 Representation by counsel also appears
more frequently in cases involving juveniles with prior court refer-
rals51 and cases involving more serious allegations. 52 Even after
controlling for these factors, however, representation is much lower
in some jurisdictions than in others.
53
Feld argues that the low rates of representation in some states
may reflect a continuing hesitance to implement the procedural
guarantees outlined in Gault.54 Feld observes that both California
47 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
48 FELD, supra note 15, at 100. Feld does not analyze how statutory frameworks im-
pact on rates of representation. In some jurisdictions, the right to counsel is unwaiv-
able. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1) (1993). Mostjurisdictions do not confer
an unwaivable right to counsel, but some statutes expressly establish requirements for
waiver. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(8)(b) (West 1992) ("Waiver of a child's
right to be represented by counsel... must be an express waiver voluntarily and intelli-
gently made by the child after the child has been fully and effectively informed of the
right being waived.... If the court accepts the child's waiver, it shall state on the record
the findings and conclusions that form the basis for its decision to accept the waiver.");
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6337 (1982) ("Counsel must be provided for a child unless
his parent, guardian, or custodian is present in court and affirmatively waive it."). Other
jurisdictions grant the right to counsel, but provide little statutory guidance for evaluat-
ing the conditions under which the right may be waived. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
272(1) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1991).
49 See Frank A. Orlando & Gary L. Crippen, The Rights of Children and the Juvenile Court,
in JUVENILE JUsTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 95 (Ira M.
Schwartz ed., 1992) (describing inadequacy ofjuvenile court judges' advisories of right
to counsel); Lemert, supra note 27, at 430 (describing cases in which juvenile court
judges discourage appointment of counsel).
50 FELD, supra note 15, at 62-64, 120. In several categories of crimes, however, de-
tained youths in North Dakota were less likely to employ the services of counsel than
released youths. Id. at 63.
51 ld at 68-70, 126.
52 Id. at 55, 126.
53 Id at 66-70. In Nebraska, for example, half of all minors with three to four prior
court referrals and presently charged with committing a felony offense against a person
go unrepresented. Id. at 69. More than 60% of Nebraska minors with three to four
prior court referrals and accused of a misdemeanor against a person proceed without
representation. Id.
54 Id at 72.
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and New York, which are presently high representation jurisdic-
tions, provided counsel in juvenile cases before the Supreme Court
constitutionalized the practice. 55 North Dakota, a low representa-
tion state, did not legislatively provide for appointment of counsel
in juvenile cases until two years after Gault.56 A number of exam-
ples, however, contradict this pattern. Minnesota, which is pres-
ently a low representation state, afforded juveniles the right to
counsel prior to Gault.57 Pennsylvania, which is currently a high rep-
resentation state, did not provide for counsel prior to Gault.58
Further research into why counsel is appointed in some cases
and declined in others would shed light on the effects of procedural
formality on the juvenile court. The apparent correlation between
harsh dispositions and representation by counsel can be explained
by several different hypotheses. 59 Information on why some minors
are represented and others are not could help determine whether
the presence of counsel is itself an aggravating factor or merely an
indication of other, underlying causes of severe sanctions. 60
55 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 679 (West 1984) (enacted in 1961); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 241 (McKinney 1988) (enacted in 1962). The California provisions did not mandate
appointment of counsel to indigent minors accused of non-felony offenses until 1967.
56 N.D. CENT CODE § 27-20-26 (1991) (enacted in 1969).
57 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (West 1992).
58 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 6337 (1982) (enacted in 1972). In some jurisdictions,
local court systems quickly accommodated the right to counsel. In Philadelphia, it has
been estimated that the rate of representation went from 5% to 40% of respondents in
less than six months after the Gault decision. Coxe, supra note 28, at 488. Despite the
surge in the numbers of represented youth, however, Coxe reported significant resist-
ance on the part of Philadelphia's judicial system. Id. at 489-90.
Court systems that guaranteed the right to counsel prior to Gault were not necessar-
ily long-standing supporters of procedural formality. As late as 1959, only three years
before the state of New York adopted statutory provisions guaranteeing the right to
counsel for juveniles in delinquency cases, only 8% of minors in delinquency cases in
New York City were represented by counsel. See Handler, supra note 15, at 22.
When state legislatures adopted right to counsel statutes on their own accord prior
to Gault, local juvenile courts were sometimes slow to accommodate the change. Cali-
fornia enacted a statutory guarantee of the right to counsel for juveniles in 1961. See
supra note 55. The vast majority of minor respondents, however, remained unrepre-
sented for at least several years. In 1961, counsel appeared in 3% of California juvenile
cases. By 1965, that figure had risen to just 10% of juvenile cases. Lemert, supra note
27, at 425-26. Similarly, the District of Columbia provided for the right to counsel prior
to Gault, but only 10 to 15% of all juveniles opted for such assistance. See In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 41 n.69 (1967).
59 See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
60 In particular, more data on socio-economic characteristics of youths who accept
and decline assistance of counsel is necessary. Further, a thorough review of the prac-
tices of juvenile court personnel during arraignment and pretrial detention hearings
could shed light on the reasons why some children accused of crimes go unrepresented.
Adult criminal court systems could also provide a useful comparison. If similar per-
centages of adults and juveniles in a given jurisdiction proceed without the assistance of
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III. THE EFFECTS OF REPRESENTATION ON DIsPosITIONS
Feld provides two measures of the impact of counsel. First, he
compares how represented and unrepresented minors are treated
within various court systems. To facilitate comparisons, Feld di-
vides jurisdictions into three categories-those providing low, me-
dium, and high rates of representation for minors. Feld then
compares the overall rates of severe dispositions in low, medium,
and high representation counties without distinguishing between
how represented and unrepresented minors are sanctioned.
When focusing on how represented and unrepresented youths
are treated within jurisdictions covered by the six-state survey, Feld
reports that representation is almost always associated with more
severe dispositions. In Pennsylvania, for example, more than 30%
of all youths accused of felony offenses against persons and repre-
sented by counsel are committed to out-of-home placements. Un-
represented children accused of felonies against persons, however,
are committed to out-of-home placements in only 16.8% of the
cases. 6 1 In Minnesota, youths accused of felonies are approximately
twice as likely to be committed to secured facilities if they are repre-
sented by counsel.6 2
The statistics cited injustice for Children always distinguish cate-
gories of criminal offenses, and thus account for the seriousness of
the charges. After accounting for the influences of pretrial deten-
tion and prior juvenile records, Feld finds that represented youths
still typically receive more severe dispositions than unrepresented
youths. 63
After reviewing the data from the six-state survey, Feld con-
ducts a more thorough inquiry using the 1986 Minnesota statistics.
The state is divided into high representation (more than 66% of
youths represented), medium representation (between 33% and
66% of youths represented), and low representation (less than 33%
of youths represented) counties.64 Statewide, 45.3% of all minors
counsel, then the low levels of representation in juvenile cases might not indicate any
unique phenomenon.
61 FELD, supra note 15, at 59.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 66-71.
64 High representation counties handle higher percentages of felonies and misde-
meanors against persons than do medium and low representation counties. Low repre-
sentation counties handle higher percentages of status offenses and misdemeanor
offenses involving property than do medium and high representation counties. Id. at 77-
78.
Somewhat surprising was the difference in the severity of sentencing for status of-
fenses. Low representation counties, which process higher percentages of status of-
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are represented by counsel at adjudicatory hearings. In high repre-
sentation counties, 94.5% of all minors are represented. In medium
representation counties, the rate decreases to 46.8% of all respon-
dents. Only 19.3% of minors are represented by counsel in low rep-
resentation counties. 65
The 1986 Minnesota data reflect the same pattern observed in
the six-state survey. Represented minors are generally penalized
more harshly than unrepresented minors. Statewide, Feld notes
that "youths with counsel are nearly three times more likely to receive
severe dispositions than those without counsel-28.1% of represented
juveniles versus 10.3% of unrepresented youths received out-of-
home placement and 17.6% versus 5.2% received secured
confinement."
6 6
Although unrepresented juveniles generally receive less severe
sanctions, the data reveal some exceptions. In high representation
counties, minors represented by counsel fare better than unrepre-
sented children in a number of categories. For example, only
34.6% of represented youths charged with felony offenses in high
representation jurisdictions are committed to out-of-home place-
ments, while 60% of unrepresented children charged with felony
offenses receive such dispositions.67 Similarly, fewer than 25% of
represented children accused of felonies in high representation
counties are sentenced to secured facilities, as compared with 40%
of unrepresented minors accused of felonies in high representation
counties. 68 Children accused of minor property offenses in high
representation counties are also more likely to face an out-of-home
placement if they are unrepresented by counsel. 69
fenses, might be expected to treat minors accused of status violations more severely
than high representation counties where judges encounter a larger percentage of felony
cases. In fact, status offenders are more than three times as likely to be committed to a
secured facility in a high representation county than in a low representation county. Id.
at 92. Although Feld does not offer an explanation for the situation, it is likely that
many of the status offenders in high representation counties are also accused of more
serious crimes. Most status offenses never reach the courtroom in high representation
counties, being screened out at earlier stages in the juvenile justice system. A large
proportion of status offenders who actually appear before a judge in a high representa-
tion county probably also have a number of prior cases and a history of non-cooperation
with probation and other services.
65 Id. at 81. Most of Feld's statistics deal with representation at the adjudicatory
hearing. At dispositional hearings, 6.4% fewer juveniles have counsel than at adjudica-
tory hearings. The largest decrease occurs in high representation counties, with a drop
from 94.5% to 66.7% of youths being represented. Id. at 82.
66 Id. at 98.
67 Id. at 99.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 99.
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The statistics indicate that some children represented by coun-
sel in high representation counties receive better treatment than un-
represented youths. Feld is careful to note, however, that very few
youths accused of felonies are unrepresented in high representation
counties. 70 Due to the small sample size, the better treatment ap-
parently received by represented children accused of felony crimes
in high representation counties may be an anomoly. Most children
receiving the services of counsel in high representation counties
face harsher dispositions than children who are unrepresented.
71
Furthermore, Feld argues that the data are still consistent with the
antagonism hypothesis, even if the small sample size does not skew
the statistics. Judges in counties with high rates of representation
are so used to the presence of counsel that defense lawyers do not
inject a uniquely adversarial element into the proceedings, as might
occur in counties where representation is a rarity. 72
In most cases, represented youths in high representation coun-
ties are treated more severely than unrepresented minors in high
representation counties. Consistent with Feld's analysis, the differ-
ences in treatment are more significant in low representation coun-
ties than in high representation counties. A youth accused of a
misdemeanor offense and represented by counsel in a high repre-
sentation county is 1.25 times more likely to be committed to an
out-of-home placement than an unrepresented youth and 1.28 times
more likely to be committed to a secured facility than an unrepre-
sented youth. In medium representation counties, a represented
youth accused of a misdemeanor is 2.3 times more likely to be com-
mitted to an out-of-home placement than an unrepresented youth
and 2.4 times more likely to be committed to a secured facility than
an unrepresented youth. In low representation counties, a repre-
sented youth charged with committing a misdemeanor offense is
2.92 times more likely to be committed to an out-of-home place-
ment than an unrepresented youth and 3.32 times more likely to be
committed to a secured facility than an unrepresented youth.
73
Thus, the lower the rate of representation in a particular jurisdic-
tion, the higher the penalty for retaining counsel in that jurisdiction.
In counties with low rates ofjuvenile representation, judges may re-
act more strongly to the presence of defense lawyers in juvenile pro-
ceedings. A judge in a low representation jurisdiction might view
the proceedings as more adversarial, and thus impose more severe
70 Id.
71 Id. at 98.
72 Id. at 100.
73 See id. at 99.
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dispositions, when counsel in present. Conversely, a juvenile court
judge in a county with a high rate of representation might be un-
fazed by the presence of defense lawyers, and thus not treat repre-
sented juveniles more harshly.
The same pattern exists after correcting for other factors that
could influence dispositions. In analyzing the 1986 Minnesota data,
Feld employs a regression model to evaluate the effects of prior out-
of-home removals, pretrial detention, severity of offense, prior rec-
ord, age, and gender. After simultaneously accounting for all of
these factors, Feld finds that representation by counsel correlates
with more severe sanctions for juvenile respondents. The largest
differences in treatment are observed in low representation coun-
ties. The smallest differential appears in high representation
counties.
74
An analysis of the systemwide impact of representation by com-
paring dispositions in low, medium, and high representation coun-
ties in Minnesota also demonstrates that higher rates of
representation are associated with more severe sanctions. The over-
all rates of commitments to out-of-home placements and secured
facilities are higher in high representation counties than in low rep-
resentation counties. 75 Over 25% of all youths charged with crimes
or status offenses in high representation counties are committed to
out-of-home placements, as compared with 20.0% in medium rep-
resentation counties and 13.9% in low representation counties.
Similarly, 15.8% of all juvenile respondents in high representation
counties are committed to secured facilities, as compared with
12.3% in medium representation counties and 7.8% in low repre-
sentation counties. 76 Thus, higher percentages of representation
correlate with systemwide harshness in dispositions.77
IV. LIMITATIONS IN THE DATA
Feld has uncovered an interesting possibility that the right to
74 Id. at 135-41.
75 Id. at 91-94.
76 Id. at 92.
77 Any comparison of different jurisdictions is difficult without data verifying a simi-
larity in socio-economic conditions and judicial philosophies. Juvenile court judges in
high representation counties in Minnesota might labor under conditions that would lead
them to impose harsher dispositions than judges in low representation counties even if
none of the minors appearing before the high representation judges were represented
by counsel. Given that Feld's data cover all counties throughout one state, however, the
data might correct for variances caused by other factors that would be present in a com-




counsel may actually hurt juveniles accused of committing criminal
offenses. His analysis, however, is only the beginning of an impor-
tant inquiry. Researchers run into pitfalls when using statistics to
analyze any judicial system. The sheer number of factors that must
be considered, combined with alternative causes for different phe-
nomena, makes statistical analysis of criminal activity and the juve-
nile court system extremely complex. Inevitably, the data used in
Justice for Children suffer from a number of shortcomings.
A. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DATA
First, some of the data are inconsistent with the antagonism hy-
pothesis. Although minors represented by counsel typically receive
more severe dispositions than unrepresented minors, the numbers
do not reveal a universal trend.- In Nebraska, for example, 58.8% of
minors accused of committing felonies against persons are repre-
sented by counsel.78 The antagonism hypothesis would predict that
represented minors should be treated more severely than unrepre-
sented minors. The statistics do not bear out the hypothesis. Only
15% of represented youths who are accused of committing felonies
against persons in Nebraska are committed to secured facilities,
compared with 21.4% of unrepresented juveniles. 79
The same pattern exists for some less serious categories of
crime. Twenty percent of represented youths accused of commit-
ting minor offenses against persons in Nebraska are committed to
out-of-home placements, as compared with 28.2%o of unrepresented
juveniles who are comparably charged. 0 Similar inconsistencies are
also present in the data from North Dakota' where the statistics do
not reflect a clear pattern of leniency for unrepresented children.8'
The above examples are anomalies. In most cases, represented
youths fare worse than unrepresented youths when it comes time for
78 IM. at 55.
79 Id. at 59. Likewise, only 25% of represented youths charged with committing felo-
nies against persons in Nebraska are committed to out-of-home placements, as com-
pared with 28.6% of unrepresented juveniles. Id.
80 Id.
81 Overall, only 37.5% ofjuveniles accused of criminal conduct in North Dakota are
represented by counsel in delinquency proceedings. Id. at 55. In the category of felo-
nies against persons, all North Dakota youths are represented by counsel. Thus, no
effective comparison can be made in that category. The statistics for other offenses,
however, do not reflect a clear pattern of leniency for unrepresented children. Only
11.8%o of represented juveniles charged with felony offenses involving property are
committed to secured facilities, as compared with 21.3% of unrepresented youths. Id. at
59. Similarly, only 9.1% of represented youths accused of misdemeanors against per-




the dispositional hearing. These examples are particularly damag-
ing to the antagonism hypothesis, however, because they occur in
low representation jurisdictions where the addition of counsel to a
proceeding should be more noticeable and therefore more provok-
ing than in high representation jurisdictions.
B. POORLY DEFINED CLASSIFICATIONS IN THE DATA
Some classifications employed by Feld do not adequately distin-
guish between different factors. Distinctions that initially appear
useful, such as separating felonies from minor offenses, can mask
differences that they are designed to reveal. In some jurisdictions,
for example, a teenager who is joy-riding in the family car without
parental consent has committed a much more serious offense than a
gang member roaming the streets with a loaded pistol.
8 2
Furthermore, fact patterns often distinguish the seriousness of
the offenses ofjuveniles charged with violating the same statute. A
minor who throws a snowball at another child on a public way has
committed an aggravated battery in some jurisdictions.8 3 Likewise,
a minor who breaks a bottle and then uses the sharp edges of the
broken glass to slash another person's face has also committed an
aggravated battery. The seriousness of the offense is an important
factor for determining whether counsel should be appointed and
how a juvenile should be treated after a finding of delinquency, but
measurement of this factor can become complicated. Thus, while
the misdemeanor/felony distinction is a convenient way to analyze
juvenile cases, it may not be the best system for data classification.
Hard data on the severity of the disposition could also be mis-
leading. Secure confinement, as defined by Feld, includes both
county-level institutions and state correctional facilities.8 4 A com-
82 Compare 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (1993) (possession of stolen vehi-
cle, class two felony with potential sentence of seven years for adults) with 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/24-1 (a)(10), (b) (1993) (unlawful use of weapons, class A misdemeanor
with potential sentence of 364 days for adults).
83 The example is not far-fetched. In some jurisdictions, the locally elected state's
attorney will pursue almost any case in which a complaining witness demands prosecu-
tion. The author has represented juveniles charged with aggravated battery arising from
a snowball fight. Similar experiences are common. See How Kids' Cases Clog the Courts,
Cm. SUN-TIMES, March 23, 1992, at 1.
"I have a case of a kid hitting someone with a spitball," saidJudgeJohn Rodgers. "I
have a 9-year-old girl here for hitting her mother. These cases do not belong in
court." They are in court because prosecutors are pursuing unsubstantiated and
inconsequential cases with frequency and fervor .... "I've asked why these cases
are brought before me," said Associate Judge Charles May. "The assistant state's
attorneys said they thought it was political. That their instructions were to
prosecute."
84 FELD, supra note 15, at 46.
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mitment to a state correctional facility is typically the most severe
sanction available to a juvenile court judge. A one-week commit-
ment to a county-level juvenile detention facility, which may or may
not be followed by a period of probation, would also constitute a
commitment to a secured facility using Feld's methodology.8 5 To
classify both of these dispositional alternatives as "severe" sanctions
might result in misleading conclusions.
C. THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DATA
Juvenile court judges consider a variety of factors when sen-
tencing a young offender. Unfortunately, Feld fails to evaluate
many characteristics that might simultaneously affect the disposition
and the appointment of counsel. In particular, the study does not
account for socio-economic factors. 86 Education, neighborhoods,
family support, psychological disorders, drug addiction, and other
circumstances can influence the dispositional decisions of juvenile
court judges.8 7 The same factors might influence whether a minor
requests counsel, how strenuously the minor pursues the right to
counsel, and how much contact the minor makes with counsel prior
to a court proceeding.
One manner of accounting for these factors would be to com-
pare juvenile justice systems in urban, suburban, and rural settings.
While Feld does make such comparisons, he does not use them as a
means of evaluating socio-economic influences on dispositions re-
ceived by youthful offenders.
Feld argues that urban juvenile courts are legalistic and punish
based on the offense, while rural juvenile courts operate informally
and emphasize rehabilitation.8 8 Using the Minnesota data, Feld re-
85 Nationally, approximately one quarter of all juvenile court dispositions of secured
confinement involve commitments to short-term detention centers rather than state cor-
rectional institutions. Orlando & Crippen, supra note 49, at 91-92.
86 See FELD, supra note 15, at 189, 220-2 1.
87 Chused studied factors that affected the dispositions ordered by juvenile court
judges in New Jersey. Factors included whether the minor lives with two parents,
whether the minor has a history of drug use, and whether the minor attends school.
Chused, supra note 27, at 508, 602-06. In their study of juvenile court systems in Win-
ston-Salem and Charlotte, North Carolina, Clarke and Koch reported that a number of
factors influenced dispositions received by respondents. Factors included whether the
respondent lives with both natural parents, a single parent, a relative, or foster parents
and whether the parents or custodian attends court hearings. Clarke & Koch, supra note
28, at 288-90.
Surprisingly, Clarke and Koch reported that the child's age, gender, race, and fam-
ily income did not have a statistically significant effect on the disposition after account-
ing for the juvenile's prior record and the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 290-93.
88 Id. at 158-62.
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ports that juveniles in urban and suburban settings are represented
by counsel more often than children accused of crimes in rural set-
tings. In urban courts, 62.6% ofjuveniles are represented in delin-
quency proceedings. In suburban courts, 55.2% of juveniles are
represented. In rural court systems, barely one quarter of youths
are represented by counsel.89
After noting the varying rates of representation, Feld presents
statistics to demonstrate that children in urban courts typically re-
ceive more severe dispositions than children in rural courts. Over
42% of Minnesota juveniles accused of committing felonies in urban
courts, for example, are committed to out-of-home placements and
a third are committed to secured facilities. 90 Only 29.5% of youths
accused of committing felonies in rural counties are committed to
out-of-home placements and 20.4% are committed to secured facili-
ties. 9 t Thus, the urban/rural comparison appears to provide further
evidence that formal courtroom procedures lead to severe disposi-
tions for youthful offenders.
The statistics cited by Feld, however, are not entirely consistent
with his hypothesis. Although suburban court systems provide
counsel at rates close to urban settings, suburban judges often im-
pose more lenient dispositions than their their rural counterparts. 92
Similarly, some categories of offenders are treated more severely in
rural courts than in either urban or suburban settings. Minnesota
females accused of felony offenses, for example, receive more severe
sanctions in rural juvenile courts than in urban or suburban juvenile
courts .93
Differences in court system resources also result in different
dispositions, regardless of the rate of representation. Urban juve-
nile court judges often have options that are unavailable to their
rural counterparts. Most obviously, urban court systems typically
employ a large number of public defenders. Thus, appointment of
counsel can be more convenient in urban than rural settings. 94
89 Id. at 183.
90 Id. at 190.
91 Id.
92 In particular, suburban juvenile court judges impose less severe sanctions than
rural juvenile court judges when adjudicating felonies against persons, felonies involv-
ing property, and misdemeanors against persons. Id. For example, only 11.4% of sub-
urban cases in which juveniles are charged with felonies against persons result in
commitments to secured facilities, as compared with 24.6% of such rural cases. Id.
93 Id. at 225.
94 Clarke and Koch reported a measurable increase in the exercise of the right to
counsel after the juvenile court in Charlotte, North Carolina established the Juvenile
Defender Project in 1976. Previously, counsel had been appointed through a list pro-
vided by the local bar association. Clarke & Koch, supra note 28, at 296-97.
660 [Vol. 84
BOOK REVIEW
Differences in resources also affect sentencing alternatives. A
county with large numbers ofjuvenile offenders and a large tax base
is more likely to maintain a separate or larger juvenile detention fa-
cility than a rural county that deals with only a handful of youthful
offenders every year, enabling urban judges to incarcerate minors
under circumstances when their rural counterparts might desire the
same dispositional option.95
Another shortcoming ofJustice for Children is the lack of data on
the practice of plea bargaining. The vast majority of criminal cases
are resolved through plea agreements. A similar pattern exists in
juvenile cases.
96
An observer cannot have a complete understanding of how at-
torneys interact with the juvenile justice system without information
comparing the percentages of represented and unrepresented chil-
dren who enter admissions or contest their cases. The percentages
of plea agreements are crucial for determining whether the right to
counsel leads to an adversarial environment in the juvenile court.97
If a larger percentage of represented minors than unrepresented
minors enter admissions, it may well be that the right to counsel is
associated with less conflict.
The statistics themselves, however, would only reveal part of
the picture. Any thorough study of the impact of the right to coun-
sel in juvenile delinquency cases must also examine the manner in
which court systems appoint counsel. In some jurisdictions, judges
might choose to appoint counsel only after discussing allegations
with minors and their families and determining whether cases will
95 The biggest flaw in comparing urban with rural statistics to evaluate the effects of
representation is that the urban/rural dichotomy is not identical to a high representa-
tionAow representation dichotomy. Hennepin County, for example, includes the urban
setting of Minneapolis and has a "well-established public defender system." FELD, supra
note 15, at 209. Less than half of all children accused of committing crimes in Hennepin
County are represented by counsel. Id. at 209. Thus, an urban setting that might be
associated with more severe dispositions is not a high representation county.
A better comparison would be low representation urban counties versus high repre-
sentation urban counties, low representation suburban counties versus high representa-
tion suburban counties, and low representation rural counties versus high
representation rural counties. These comparisons would better account for socio-eco-
nomic differences as they influence rates of representation and severity of dispositions in
juvenile court systems.
96 See JOSEPH W. ROGERS & G. LARRY MAYS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE 366 (1987); MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 58 (study of one wealthy, suburban
county); Clarke & Koch, supra note 28, at 297 (during study ofjuvenile courts in Win-
ston-Salem and Charlotte, North Carolina, 72.4% ofjuveniles entered admissions).
97 During their study of the juvenile court systems in Winston-Salem and Charlotte,
North Carolina, Clarke and Koch reported that 68.3% of represented juveniles admitted
to the allegations in their cases, while 79.7% of unrepresented children admitted to the
allegations. Clarke & Koch, supra note 28, at 298.
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be contested. Thus, defense counsel would only enter the picture
when an adversarial position has already been established.
Another important factor to be considered is the percentage of
cases that are dismissed, both before and after the appointment of
counsel. Feld's data are limited to delinquency cases that are for-
mally filed, thus avoiding cases that are informally disposed of by
juvenile court screening departments.98 Even after a petition has
been filed, however, cases are often dismissed.99 Frequently, com-
plaining witnesses fail to appear for court dates. Other factors may
also influence a prosecutor to dismiss a petition prior to an adjudi-
catory hearing.
The timing of dismissals could have a significant effect on statis-
tics evaluating the impact of representation by counsel. If charges
are dismissed prior to any decision to appoint counsel, the seem-
ingly good treatment received by unrepresented minors may be the
fortuitous result of counsel not yet being appointed. 10 0 In other
words, if judges wait to see whether cases will be dismissed before
appointing counsel, then the better treatment apparently received
by unrepresented juveniles may be the result of dismissals by prose-
cutors rather than the result of leniency by judges.
D. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DATA
The antagonism hypothesis is only one of several possible ex-
planations for the data reported by Feld. The decision to appoint
counsel may be associated with severe dispositions because judges
might predict the disposition at the time of arraignment and might
encourage appointment of counsel when a child is at risk of being
committed to a secured facility or an out-of-home placement. 1' 1 In
less populated counties, one judge might hear every juvenile case.
Prior experience with a particular youth or the youth's family could
cause a judge to foresee the disposition. In high volume or urban
settings, judges could also have past dealings with certain juvenile
98 FELD, supra note 15, at 43-44.
99 KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 56 (estimating that 37% of all juvenile court
petitions are dismissed prior to adjudication).
100 In Minnesota, Feld reports that the charges are dismissed for 5% of represented
juveniles, as compared with 23.8% of unrepresented minors. FELD, supra note 15, at
144. Clarke and Koch found that 46.4% of cases involving unrepresented juveniles
were dismissed, while only 36.2% of cases involving the juvenile defender and 30.7% of
cases involving the court appointed counsel were dismissed. Clarke & Koch, supra note
28, at 298-99. Neither Feld nor Clarke and Koch compare the timing of appointments
of counsel with the timing of dismissals of cases.
101 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. See also Clarke & Koch, supra note
28, at 267 ("it was easy for juvenile court judges to evade the requirement of counsel
simply by not appointing counsel when lenient dispositions were expected.").
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respondents depending upon how the court system is organized. If
cases are assigned to judges based on geographic factors, as is the
practice in Chicago's juvenile court system, then each judge hears
cases arising only from a specific neighborhood. Thus, an urban
judge could have as much prior contact with a particular juvenile as
judges in rural or suburban settings.
Other factors could enable a judge to anticipate a severe dispo-
sition at the time of appointment of counsel. The judge might be
exposed to information regarding the juvenile's prior criminal his-
tory or the facts of the case during a pretrial detention hearing. Ad-
ditionally, some probation departments prepare pretrial social
evaluations, which could tip-off a judge or a prosecutor as to the
potential disposition in a case and lead to appointment of coun-
sel.' 0 2 Whatever the source of the information, some judges can
gauge whether minors are at risk of being committed to a state cor-
rectional facility or a residential treatment program when admonish-
ing children and their families of their right to counsel.
Feld discusses other explanations for the correlation between
counsel and severe dispositions. Attorneys who represent minors
might be "incompetent and prejudice their clients' cases." 0 3 Public
defenders who represent juveniles are typically overwhelmed by un-
reasonably large caseloads.' 0 4 Additionally, many public defender
offices assign their least experienced attorneys to juvenile court.10 5
Regardless of the varying levels of competence of attorneys repre-
senting juveniles, however, it is doubtful that many children or their
parents are better advocates than professional attorneys who regu-
larly handle delinquency cases and who have completed law school.
Feld also theorizes that the therapeutic ideology of the juvenile
court might lead defense attorneys to advocate what they believe is
in their clients' "best interests," rather than their clients' legal
rights. 06 The rules of professional responsibility do not contain
any exceptions for defense attorneys representing juveniles accused
of crimes.107 The blatant ethical breach suggested by Feld would be
102 KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 79.
103 FELD, supra note 15, at 73.
104 Randolph N. StoneJuvenile Justice: A Dream Deferred, CRIM.JUST., Winter 1994, at I
(reporting average caseloads of 350-450 open cases per attorney in the Juvenile Division
of the Office of the Cook County Public Defender in Chicago, Illinois).
105 Id.
106 FELD, supra note 15, at 255.
107 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1992) (Scope of Represen-
tation); Id. at Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule); Id at Rule 1.14(a) (Client
Under a Disability). Rule 1.14 cautions: "[w]hen a client's ability to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because
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astounding if present throughout most of the juvenile court defense
bar. Furthermore, while a desire to help children might explain
high rates of out-of-home placements for represented youths, such
as commitments to substance abuse treatment programs, it strains
the imagination to believe that defense attorneys are working to
commit their juvenile clients to state correctional facilities out of a
belief that their clients will be rehabilitated in such institutions.1 0 8
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The juvenile court system is currently the subject of much de-
bate.10 9 Observers cite the breakdown of the family and rising levels
of violence as evidence that our society should change its approach
toward crime by youth. Many commentators fault the juvenile court
for being too lenient. Public officials are reacting to the criticism
through a variety of measures including statutes that automatically
transfer cases involving young offenders to criminal courts, determi-
nate sentencing schemes for children whose cases remain at juvenile
courts, and increased institutionalization of children in adult and ju-
venile correctional facilities. 110
of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reason-
ably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." The Com-
mittee Comments to Rule 1.14 state, "children as young as five or six years of age, and
certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to
weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody." Id at Rule 1.14 cmt.
108 But see Orlando & Crippen, supra note 49, at 95; ANTHONY M. PLATrr, THE CHILD
SAVERS 168-72 (2d ed. 1977) (describing the co-option of a public defender in Chicago's
juvenile court); Lemert, supra note 27, at 431 (describing the co-option of public defend-
ers in California juvenile courts).
109 See Stone, supra note 104, at 1; KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 1-2; MAHO-
NEY, supra note 15, at 50-51. Polls reflect conflicting public opinions. While most peo-
ple support rehabilitative efforts for young offenders, public sentiment also favors
punitive measures and transferring cases to the adult criminal court system. See KRIS-
BERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 2-3, 175-76; Ira M. Schwartz, Juvenile Crime-Fighting
Policies: What the Public Really Wants, in JUVENILEJUsTICE AND PUBLIC POLIcY-TOWARDS A
NATIONAL AGENDA 216 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992).
110 See Stone, supra note 104, at 1, 50; FELD, supra note 15, at 249-65; Orlando &
Crippen, supra note 49, at 93; MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 128. After analyzing legislative
intent clauses, appellate court opinions, dispositional practices, and conditions in juve-
nile correctional facilities, Feld argues that today's juvenile courts are punishing chil-
dren for their crimes more than rehabilitating them for their future welfare. FELD, supra
note 15, at 263-69, 274-78. A growing number ofjuvenile court acts de-emphasize reha-
bilitative goals in their statements of purpose. Id. at 264 (citing California, Florida, and
Indiana statutes). Various state appellate courts have also condoned the imposition of
punitive measures via the juvenile court system. See, e.g., In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d
947, 950 (Nev. 1983) ("By formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent
sanctions for criminal offenses, juvenile courts will be properly and somewhat belatedly
expressing society's firm disapproval ofjuvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat
of punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile population"). The transfer of juvenile
cases to the adult criminal system is not a new phenomenon. During the first year of
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Other observers call for a renewal of the progressive move-
ment's ideal of a rehabilitative juvenile court system that informally
makes determinations in children's best interests. The problem
with the juvenile court, some argue, is that society does not devote
enough resources to needy children. Although commitments to
correctional facilities are sometimes necessary, such commitments
represent failures on the part of the juvenile court system and soci-
ety. These critics envision a system in which social workers and psy-
chological experts fashion individualistic treatment plans to reform
young offenders.
The data injustice for Children present a dilemma for those who
wish to afford procedural protections to juveniles at the adjudica-
tory stage of delinquency proceedings while retaining an individual-
istic, treatment orientation at the dispositional stage. Is it possible
to "convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution"'
while simultaneously maintaining the progressive movement's vi-
sion of a non-punitive, rehabilitative agency? Feld answers this
question in the negative and then explores the implications.
Feld proposes three potential futures for the juvenile court.
First, the juvenile court can return to an informal, rehabilitative
model. Second, the juvenile court can adopt an openly punitive
model in which young offenders receive all procedural protections
enjoyed by adults. Finally, society can abolish the juvenile court sys-
tem and try children's cases in adult courts.112 After evaluating
these options, Feld proposes that the juvenile court system be elimi-
nated and that children receive additional procedural protections in
criminal proceedings."1 3
Feld rejects the informal, rehabilitative model of the juvenile
court for a number of reasons. Assuming we could turn back the
clock to a non-adversarialjuvenile court, Feld questions whether the
potential abuses associated with informal structures are worth the
Chicago's juvenile court, Judge Richard Tuthill transferred 37 children's cases to the
criminal court. MENNEL, supra note 15, at 133. The numbers of cases being transferred
to the adult system, however, appear to be increasing. Stone, supra note 102, at 50;
Orlando & Crippen, supra note 49, at 92.
The public and the media often express dissatisfaction with seemingly lenient
sentences given to youthful offenders. Typical are the comments of a recent editorial in
the Phoenix Gazette: "[T]he most dangerous group in America today is the teenage or
young adult male with an early start into violent crime. That's where the incapacitation
argument, the deterrent effect, might actually operate. Right now, juveniles laugh at the
system. It's no deterrent." Richard DeUriarte, Sentences; Public Safety is the Priority, PHOE-
Nix GAzE'rE, August 23, 1993, at A9.
111 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 79 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112 FELD, supra note 15, at 279-93.
"13 Id. at 284-93.
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advantages. 1 4 Procedural formality brings with it certain benefits.
By definition, procedures reduce arbitrary treatment. Moreover,
formality arguably increases the accuracy of determinations.
Additionally, society would have to commit more resources to
reforming young offenders if the traditional model of the juvenile
court is ever to become a reality. Past experience indicates that such
a commitment is unlikely. 1" 5
Feld's second proposal is an adversarial juvenile court. 1 6 In
this model, juvenile courts would no longer have jurisdiction over
status offenders. Legislatures would fashion proportional and de-
terminate sentencing schemes for juvenile delinquents. Children
would be provided with the right to jury trials and a non-waivable
right to counsel."l 7
A separate, albeit punitive, juvenile justice system would retain
some of the advantages of the progressive movement's vision of the
juvenile court. Minors would not be stigmatized with a "criminal"
label. Further, comparatively greater services would arguably re-
main available for dispositions in an independent juvenile court." 18
The data explored in Justice for Children, however, indicate that
procedural formality leads to severe sanctions. Given the effect that
the right to counsel appears to have, Feld argues, jury trials and
non-waivable defense counsel are likely to hasten the transforma-
tion of juvenile courts into purely punitive institutions. Inevitably,
juvenile courts would adopt more severe sentencing guidelines, and
the differences between juvenile and criminal courts would
disappear. 119
Given the pressures for retribution and the increasingly harsh
treatment of young offenders, Feld reasons, we should simply rec-
ognize the inevitable and eliminate the juvenile court as a separate
institution. 120 He proposes that the criminal courts hear cases in-
volving children as well as adults. He argues that the elimination of
the juvenile court would be advantageous, principally because chil-
dren would no longer be subjected to "an inferior justice sys-
tem." 12 1 Additionally, society would save the resources currently
used on transfer hearings. 122
114 Id. at 279-80.
115 Id. at 279-81.
116 Id. at 281.
'17 Id. at 282.
118 Id. at 283.
119 Id. at 283.
120 Id. at 284-93.
121 Id. at 292.
122 Id. at 289.
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Feld envisions some changes in practice for criminal cases in-
volving children. Due to lower levels of capacity, the standard for
an adult's knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is
not applicable to juveniles.123 To compensate, the right to counsel
should be non-waivable for minors in criminal cases. Additionally,
Feld proposes reduced sentencing schemes for juveniles due to
their diminished responsibility.1 24 Thus, juveniles would receive
more procedural protections than adults.
It is ironic that after questioning the value of procedural for-
mality throughout most of his book, Feld concludes with a call for
more procedural protections. If the rehabilitative juvenile court is
destined to fail, however, Feld's vision might be preferable to a co-
vertly punitive court system that shortchanges children's rights.
Obviously, one need not accept Feld's hypothesis. The link be-
tween punishments and procedures is not necessarily causal. Even
before the Supreme Court guaranteed rights to children in Gault,
many observers called for more severe sanctions to combat juvenile
crime. 125 Correspondingly, large numbers of juvenile court judges
did not make use of therapeutic social services to reform children
prior to Gault.126 In at least some jurisdictions, juvenile offenders
were incarcerated in state correctional institutions more frequently
before the Supreme Court imposed procedural protections. 27
While Feld's data is impressive, additional research is necessary.
123 Id. at 291.
124 Id. at 284-89.
125 See MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 24; Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional Rights injuve-
nile Court, 46 A.B.A. J. 1206, 1208 (1960) (commenting on the public pressure felt by
judges to crackdown on juvenile offenders); Richard W. Miller, Responsibility--In Criminal
Law and in Treating Juvenile Offenders, 23 UMKC L. REV. 267, 278-81 (1955); John H.
Wigmore, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375, 376-77 (1926).
126 See Alper, supra note 28, at 47-48; Coxe, supra note 28, at 489. At the time of the
Gault decision, 80% to 90% ofjuvenile court judges had no psychologist or psychiatrist
available to evaluate minors and recommend treatment plans. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14
n.14 (1967). One third ofjuvenile court judges ordered dispositions without as much as
a social worker or a probation officer to report on the child's background. Id.
Unfortunately, judges could rarely employ personal expertise to make up for the
lack of outside input. In 1967, half of all juvenile court judges did not even have a
college degree. Id. What they lacked in formal schooling, they did not make up for in
experience. Three quarters of juvenile court judges devoted less than one quarter of
their professional efforts to children's cases. Id.
127 According to one study, juvenile respondents in North Carolina were committed
to correctional institutions in 26.3% of cases between 1934 and 1939, and in 25.1% of
the cases between 1939 and 1944. Clarke & Koch, supra note 28.
Clarke and Koch then evaluated juvenile cases arising in Winston-Salem and Char-
lotte, North Carolina, during 1975 through 1976. They reported significantly lower
rates of commitment in the 1970s than in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1975 and 1976, the
respondent was committed to a state correctional facility in 8% of all juvenile cases and
13.5% of cases in which the judge made a finding of delinquency. Id. at 270 n.7, 275.
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Nonetheless, it is hard to deny society's punitive impulses when
dealing with juvenile offenders. By its nature, the juvenile court
provides services only after a determination that a minor is delin-
quent. The reason these children come to our attention is not their
lack of food, shelter, clothing, education, health, or stable families.
The only common characteristic of all children adjudicated delin-
quent is that they have violated society's rules. Although the juve-
nile court system may try to focus on the needs of these children,
their criminal conduct inevitably garners society's attention.
The current calls for more severe sanctions for young offenders
are merely a manifestation of society's conflicting attitudes toward
juvenile crime and the juvenile court. When confronted with a vio-
lent crime, the first instinct of many observers is to demand swift
punishment and decry attempts at rehabilitation, regardless of the
offender's age. At the same time, most people believe that children
are less mature and therefore less responsible for their criminal con-
duct. 128 Further, most people believe that youngsters are more
amenable to rehabilitative programs than adults. 129 Few people
wholeheartedly accept or reject either viewpoint. The result has
been a separate juvenile court system that simultaneously dispenses
rehabilitation and retribution. In light of these conflicting attitudes,
perhaps we should not be so surprised if procedural protections in
juvenile delinquency proceedings feed into our contradictory im-
pulses and lead to harsher treatment for young offenders.
128 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality):
([L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by ajuvenile than to a compa-
rable crime committed by an adult .... Inexperience, less education, and less intel-
ligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.)
129 KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 2-3, 175-76; Schwartz, supra note 109, at 216.
668 [Vol. 84
0091-4169/93/8403-0669
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 84, No. 3
Copyright 0 1993 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
VICTIMS OF CRIMES: REPORTING,
IDENTIFICATION AND VALUES
HARVEY WALLACE*
AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING. By Martin S. Greenberg
and R. Barry Ruback. Plenum Press 1992. Pp. 293.
Professors Greenberg and Ruback's book, After the Grime: Victim
Decision Making, examines the various aspects of the crime victim's
decision-making process.' After the Crime is a concise, well-written
book which documents new research on the effects of external fac-
tors on victim behavior, offers insight into the identification abilities
of victim eyewitnesses, and provides a theoretical model for under-
standing the process of victim decision-making. Prosecutors may
find chapter four, entitled "Eyewitness Identification by Theft Vic-
tims," of particular interest and value, as defense attorneys will un-
doubtedly use it during trials.
Chapter one introduces the subject of victims and their deci-
sion-making processes by examining victimization as a social prob-
lem, victim reaction to crime, and the purpose and strategy of
research on victim decision-making. The chapter provides a brief
overview of the victims' movement 2 in the United States, including a
discussion of various organizations that deal with crime victims.3 To
* Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, California State University,
Fresno. Professor Wallace is the former Fresno City Attorney (1987-92) and County
Counsel for Butte County, California (1985-87). He also served as a Deputy District
Attorney in the San Diego District Attorney's Office (1974-79) and is the author and
coauthor of several soon to be published college texts in the area of police administra-
tion, criminal law and family violence.
1 MARTIN S. GREENBERG & R. BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION
MAKING (1992).
2 Greenberg and Ruback define the victims' movement as "public and professional
concern for crime victims" which grew in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 3.
3 The authors refer to national surveys conducted by Bureau of Justice Statistics
regarding the number of crimes, but fail to mention that many forms of violence are
considered to be underreported. See, e.g., NAT'L VICTIM CTR. & CRIME VICTIMS RE-
SEARCH & TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5 (1992) (sug-




their credit, the authors do not define terms according to their own
discipline. Rather, they set forth a broad and comprehensive defini-
tion of victimization as "a multidisciplinary endeavor involving con-
tributions from criminology and sociology, psychology, social work,
nursing and psychiatry." 4 The authors analyze victim reaction to
crime from a psychological perspective and focus on the victim's de-
cision of whether or not to report the crime to authorities.
Chapter two covers the experiments conducted by the authors
involving a simulated theft of money from a "victim." The authors
placed a newspaper advertisement requesting clerical assistance, to
which they received over one thousand responses.5 After eliminat-
ing some participants for failure to follow directions or suspected
knowledge about the experiment, the researchers set up their
"crime" with the remaining 768 valid subjects. The researchers
paid the participants the money promised them in the newspaper
advertisement for completing certain administrative work, and then
informed the participants that they would receive an additional sum
of money-either twenty or three dollars depending on their pro-
ductivity-which would be measured by the amount of completed
work they turned in. This additional work was subsequently stolen
from them by a confederate posing as another participant. The con-
federate turned in the extra work and received the money which
should have gone to the participant. 6
The experiment involved the loss or "theft" of either three dol-
lars or twenty dollars. Most citizens probably consider such a loss to
be a fairly minor crime, which may have influenced the participant's
decision of whether or not to report the theft. The participants
were unaware of the nature of the study until the conclusion of the
experiment.
7
The researchers monitored and recorded each victim's reac-
tions and responses, and then introduced variables to produce dif-
ferent reactions. These reactions became the basis of the authors'
conclusions regarding victim decision-making processes .
Greenberg and Ruback selected the crime of theft as the basis
of the experiment for valid reasons. First, theft is one of the most
frequently reported crimes in the United States.9 Second, they
could avoid inflicting the stress that might accompany a violent of-
4 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 6.
5 Id. at 19.
6 Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 29.
8 Id. at 35-36.
9 See LISA D. BASTIAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1991 (1993).
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fense. 10 The authors conducted follow-up surveys regarding identi-
fication of the suspect several months after the "crime."
The authors were careful to avoid exposing the subjects to un-
duly high levels of emotional distress during the experiment. How-
ever, they failed to fully discuss the ethics of using individuals
unaware of the true intent behind the simulated crime. Unfortu-
nately, the authors wait until the Appendix to discuss a lawsuit filed
against them by one of the participants, who claimed that the re-
searchers were negligent, and in the alternative asserted that their
acts intentionally caused her to suffer emotional distress because of
the experiment. 1
Although the lawsuit was dismissed on a motion for directed
verdict,12 it raises issues regarding potential liability for all research-
ers utilizing human subjects. All experimental studies must con-
sider the ethics of the research and evaluate any potential liability.
Issues such as liability for research, informed consent, and ethics
should have been discussed in more detail in earlier chapters.
Greenberg and Ruback next examine the effect of different vari-
ables on the decision-making process of victims. In a series of stud-
ies, they introduce different factors into the experiment and review
the various forces to determine which variables, if any, influenced
the victim's decision to report the crime.
In one study, the authors examine social and emotional factors
in victim decision-making, considering whether advice from by-
standers or the level of the victim's anger have any effect upon
whether the victim will contact the police.13 Although they conclude
that the victim's emotional state is an important factor in crime re-
porting, Greenberg and Ruback reach no definitive conclusion re-
garding the effect of bystander advice on the victim's decision-
making process. 14 However, the authors indicate that bystanders
who offer unambiguous advice to call the police and good reasons
to do so facilitate victim reporting.15
10 The authors validated their research by conducting a pilot study during the devel-
opment and testing of the paradigm. GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 20.
11 In the first cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the researchers failed to take
reasonable steps to guard against foreseeable injury that occurred because of the experi-
ment. The second cause of action relied on the theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered insomnia, traumatic neurosis,
paranoid ideas of reference, depression and other mental and emotional problems as a
result of the experiment. Id. at 248, 251.
12 Id. at 258.
13 Id. at 44.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 50.
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Another study evaluates the effect of gender on victim and by-
stander crime-reporting. The authors had hypothesized that mem-
bers of the same sex might be more empathetic toward each other,
and that such empathy might influence the decision to report or not
report. 16 The study, however, indicates that similarities in sex be-
tween the bystander and the victim have no discernible impact on
the victim's decision to report the crime.' 7
A third study considers the effect of "shared fate" on the deci-
sion to report. Previous research has shown that when another per-
son suffers a fate similar to that of the victim, the "co-victims"
influence each other to report.' 8 Greenberg and Ruback's study
corroborates these earlier findings.' 9 The participants explained in
postexperimental debriefing that a person who had suffered the
same fate provided them with social support in reporting the crime.
Typical responses included statements such as "[h]er position was
the same as mine, which gave me more confidence." '20
Another particularly interesting section of the book deals with
the dynamics of eyewitness identification by theft victims. The au-
thors briefly review previous research in this area and conclude that
it focused on identification by a witness or bystander, rather than
identification by the victim.2 1 Greenberg and Ruback take a novel
approach and focus on the theft victim's eyewitness identification.
Eyewitness identification is often critical in convincing the jury
of defendant guilt.2 2 As succinctly stated by one authority, eyewit-
ness testimony can persuade a jury, even though it may not be
accurate:
[E]yewitness testimony is likely to be believed by jurors, especially
when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the
accuracy of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not
be related to one another at all. All the evidence points rather strik-
ingly to the conclusion that there is almost nothing more convincing
than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says, "That's the one!"23
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the prosecutor may
bring out facts regarding the identification-such as how long the
16 Id. at 53.
17 Id. at 57.
18 See, e.g., Joanne V. Wood, Theory and Research Concerning Social Comparisons of Personal
Attributes, 106 PSCHOL. BULL. 231 (1989).
19 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 62.
20 Id. at 61.
21 Id. at 66.
22 MARVIN ZALMAN & LARRY SIEGEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTION AND SOCI-
ETY 516 (1991).
23 ELIZABETH LoFrs, EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
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witness or victim was able to observe the defendant, the lighting
conditions, and the eyesight of the witness. Most experienced pros-
ecutors understand that unless they bring these facts out on direct
examination, the defense attorney will pounce on the witness in an
attempt to discredit the identification.
In addition to the questions regarding lighting, eyesight and
other physical factors, some defense attorneys will attempt to show
that the witness identified the defendant only because the witness
saw the defendant at the preliminary hearing or an unduly sugges-
tive line-up or show-up. 24 The defense attorney may devote the en-
tire cross examination to discrediting the identification of the
defendant.
The use of expert witnesses to attack the identification process
has been the subject of heated debate.25 The trial court generally
has discretion to decide whether to admit expert testimony.
26
Where there is additional evidence of guilt independent of the eye-
witness identification, appellate courts may uphold the trial court's
determination to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eye-
witness identification.27 However, if the only evidence linking the
defendant to the crime is eyewitness identification and an expert can
aid the jury in its determinations, appellate courts have ruled that it
is an abuse of discretion to exclude such expert testimony.28
Numerous authorities have suggested that eyewitness identifi-
cation of strangers is notoriously unreliable. 29 One study reported
that the stress of the crime can significantly affect the perception
and the memory of the victim.3 0 Other research indicates that sug-
24 A lineup has been defined as "a police identification procedure by which the sus-
pect in a crime is exhibited before the victim or witness to determine if he committed the
offense. In a lineup, the suspect is lined up with other individuals for purposes of iden-
tification." A showup is defined as a "[o]ne-to-one confrontation between a suspect and
a witness to a crime. It is a form of pretrial identification procedure in which the suspect
is confronted by or exposed to the victim of or witness to a crime." ZALMAN & SIEGEL,
supra note 22, at 515.
25 See, e.g., PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 212-
13 (1965); Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Juy in Eyewitness
Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992).
•26 Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962).
27 United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152
(9th Cir. 1973).
28 United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 1987).
29 See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ER-
RORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932). Professor Borchard's classic work documents early
cases of individuals who were found guilty of felonies and later determined to be inno-
cent. The great majority of these cases involved mistaken eyewitness identification.




gestions by authority figures such as police influence the identifica-
tion process. 31
Greenberg and Ruback, however, contribute to this debate with
three studies on victim identification of perpetrators of crimes. Each
study examines a specific variable in the process of suspect identifi-
cation by the victim of a theft. These studies should provide further
ammunition for defense attorneys in their quest to establish reason-
able doubt in criminal cases.
One study, for instance, evaluates the effect of prior identifica-
tion on subsequent line-up identifications. One-half of the victims
were shown a photographic lineup immediately after the crime and
asked to identify the suspect. The other half of the victim partici-
pants did not see a photographic lineup. Two months later, re-
searchers asked all of the victims to select the offender from a
photographic lineup. The victims who had previously identified a
suspect from a photographic lineup identified the defendant more
successfully than those who had not been exposed to a prior
lineup.3 2
Another experiment evaluates the effect of the passage of time
on the identification process. Researchers asked victims to identify
the suspect at two and fifteen month intervals. The authors con-
clude that there is no significant difference in the results given a
lapse of thirteen months between each occurrence of suspect
identification. 33
Greenberg and Ruback also examine the effects of race on iden-
tification. Previous research had shown that observers are better
able to identify persons of their own race than those of a different
race.3 4 The authors conclude that while this principle applies to
white victims, it does not apply to African-American victims. 3 5 More
specifically, a white victim may have problems identifying a non-
white offender; however, a black victim will not have the same diffi-
culty identifying an offender who is a member of another race. One
authority conducted similar research and reached similar
conclusions:
[C]onsiderable evidence indicates that people are poorer at identifying
31 Frederic D. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 989 (1977).
32 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 66. The group which had not viewed the
prior lineup achieved an 80% accuracy rate while the group that had seen the lineup
before achieved a 98% accuracy rate. Id.
33 Id. at 73.
34 John C. Brigham & Paul Barkowitz, Do "They All Look Alike"? The Effect of Race, Sex,
Experience, and Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 8 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 306 (1978).
35 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 76.
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members of another race than of their own. Some studies have found
that, in the United States at least, whites have greater difficulty recog-
nizing black faces than vice versa. Moreover, counterintuitively, the
ability to perceive the physical characteristics of a person from another
racial group apparently does not improve significantly upon increased
contact with other members of that race. Because many crimes are
cross-racial, these factors may play an important part in reducing the
accuracy of eyewitness perception.
3 6
By focusing on the victim, rather than the bystander, as the eye-
witness, these studies provide an important contribution to the liter-
ature on eyewitness identification. Clearly, as with any research
project, there are shortcomings based upon the artificial nature of
these studies and the fact that the victims were informed that no real
crime had been committed. However, the conclusions lend support
to other studies and should provide defense attorneys and prosecu-
tors with insight into the identification process utilized by a crime
victim.
Greenberg and Ruback took great pains to validate the accuracy
and consistency of their research. The researchers took steps to in-
sure the results obtained from their experiment were due to their
manipulations, and not to the subjects' awareness of the study.
3 7
They conclude that the participants had a low suspicion rate, were
involved in the assigned tasks, and reacted to the experiments as
intended.
38
The authors conclude that their experiments were highly valid
and that the results could be accepted as an accurate projection of
what occurs during actual thefts. Their conclusion is probably cor-
rect. While perhaps subject to minor flaws such as the size of the
sample group, their research methodology and conclusions are sup-
ported by sound scientific principles. In addition, Greenberg and
Ruback's conclusions are well reasoned and logical.
The remainder of the text concentrates on information and
data obtained outside the previously discussed controlled experi-
ments. In chapter six, Greenberg and Ruback examine how victims
decide whether to call the police and report a theft. The authors
surveyed students in four countries: the United States, Thailand,
India and Nigeria. These students answered questions regarding
their perception of crime and notification of law enforcement agen-
cies. Seriousness of the crime had a strong influence on the victim's
behavior and on whether the victim notified the police.3 9 Although
36 Woocher, supra note 31, at 982.
37 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 1, at 82.
38 Id. at 84.
39 Id. at 115.
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social norms regarding the appropriateness of calls to the police va-
ried with the characteristics of the crime and the population stud-
ied,40 the survey indicated that the seriousness of crime in each
country was influenced by whether the offender used a gun, as well
as the degree of injury to the victim.
41
The authors successfully corroborate their research findings by
reviewing particular police departments' records regarding specific
types of crimes and reporting patterns.42 Although limited to file
review in various law enforcement agencies, this research reinforces
previous conclusions and findings that social and emotional factors
are important considerations in determining whether a victim will
report a crime.
In an attempt to compensate for their inability to interview the
"victims" of their experiment, the authors conducted a survey of
actual crime victims using questionnaires and interviews.
43
Through this survey, Greenberg and Ruback hoped to determine
what factors influenced the victims' immediate and delayed re-
sponses to crime. The survey method of research, however, has in-
herent problems regarding its validity. For example, the victims
may not know why they acted in certain ways, they may intentionally
withhold information from the interviewer, or they may not accu-
rately recall their feelings and reasons for acting as they did.44 De-
spite these problems, so-called self-reporting is one of the most
commonly used methods of studying crime victim reaction, due to
its convenience and the ability of the interviewer to conduct an in-
depth examination of the victim.
4 5
Greenberg and Ruback's study found that social influences play
a significant role in the decision to report or not report a crime.
Victims indicated that they frequently spoke with other persons in
deciding whether to report the crime, often confiding in family or
friends. The authors conclude that social influence plays an impor-
tant role both in crime reporting and in the victim's "subsequent
40 Id. For example, in a hypothetical case of one person beating another person with
his fists, participants in the United States gave equal approval to the reporting of the
crime to the police, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator or the victim. Partici-
pants in other countries, however, gave less approval to the reporting of the crime when
the victim was the wife of the perpetrator. Id.
41 Id. at 114.
42 Id. at 129.
43 Id. at 151.
44 Martin S. Greenberg et al., Decision Making by Crime Victims: A Multimethod Approach,
17 LAw & Soc'y REV. 47, 57 (1982).
45 GREENBERG & RUBACK, sup-a note 1, 152.
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willingness to cooperate with the prosecution of the case."'46
Based on their research, the authors propose a theoretical
model for understanding the dynamics of victim decision-making.
Their model is composed of three stages: (a) victims label or recog-
nize behavior as a crime, (b) they determine its seriousness, and (c)
they decide what action to take.47 Each of these stages is influenced
by variables such as the victim's reaction to the crime, perceived or
actual harm, and support of family and friends.
While this model may not apply to all victims in all circum-
stances, it provides a useful framework for additional empirical re-
search which may further enhance our understanding of victims'
mental processes. 48 Greenberg and Ruback's efforts provide a sig-
nificant contribution to the study of victim decision making.
After the Crime provides its readers with a careful, thought-out
examination of victim decision-making. Its experiments and studies
expand on existing research, and its model for future research will
undoubtedly be utilized by other scholars in an ever-expanding
quest to understand victims' reactions to crime. The chapter dis-
cussing eyewitness identification is essential for all attorneys partici-
pating in criminal trials which involve the victim's identification of
the defendant. Yet the book's usefulness is not limited to this select
group. With its carefully conducted research and thoughtful analy-
sis, After the Crime is an excellent text for any professional in the
criminal justice system.
46 Id at 178. The authors' findings are supported by the results of the National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a biannual survey conducted by the Department of
Justice and the Bureau of the Census. First developed in 1972 to more fully understand
the impact of crime on victims, census takers contact and survey 50,000 dwellings re-
garding both reported and unreported crimes. Because the survey includes crimes that
have not been reported to law enforcement agencies, it is considered a more compre-
hensive and reliable sample for purposes of determining the extent of crimes in the
United States than the Uniform Crime Report conducted by the FBI, which only lists
reported and known crimes. RuTH MASTERS & CLIFF ROBERTSON, INSIDE CRIMINOLOGY
69 (1990).
47 Id. at 182.
48 Id. at 184.
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